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Abstract 
Structural priming offers a powerful method for experimentally investigating the mental 
representation of linguistic structure. We clarify the nature of our proposal, justify the 
versatility of priming, consider alternative approaches, and discuss how our specific account 
can be extended to new questions as part of an interdisciplinary programme integrating 
linguistics and psychology as part of the cognitive sciences of language. 
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In our target article, we argue for an experimental approach to linguistic representation, and 
demonstrate how structural priming can be used to develop a psychologically motivated 
account of how people represent linguistic structure.  If one utterance primes another, then we 
argue that they share structure.  Patterns of priming are therefore informative about the way 
in which people represent language. While acknowledging the continuing value and 
importance of acceptability judgements in developing representational hypotheses, we 
proposed that priming is in many ways superior: It is an implicit behavioral measure that taps 
representation. And it allows us to study representation in all groups, including those such as 
young children who cannot make acceptability judgments. 
In recent years, many experimental studies using structural priming have helped us to 
understand language users’ representations. These studies suggest that semantic information 
is represented separately from syntactic information. The single semantic level encodes 
information about scope relations, information structure, and thematic structure. The single 
syntactic level, which draws on well-formedness constraints concerning local linear and 
hierarchical relations, includes syntactic category information and some ‘missing’ elements 
(i.e., elements that are not uttered) but does not involve syntactic movement.  At present, 
linguists propose incompatible theories and there is no sign that the near-exclusive use of 
acceptability judgments is ever going to determine which type of theory is correct.  In 
contrast, the findings from priming are compatible with some theories and incompatible with 
others. 
The commentators take a unified view that researchers from different disciplines should 
cooperate in investigating linguistic representation, as a single integrated programme of 
research.  They unanimously agree that an experimental approach to linguistic representation 
is valuable, and largely accept that structural priming is informative in this regard.  In other 
words, they do not feel that it is relevant only to the study of how language is produced and 
comprehended.  But they differ about the versatility of priming, how directly it taps into 
representation, and its advantages over other methods (in particular acceptability judgments). 
They also take different views about our conclusions regarding aspects of linguistic 
representation, and make specific proposals for further research. 
 We are pleased that our proposal has met with such interest, and hope that it will encourage a 
future programme of cooperative interdisciplinary research on linguistic representation. In 
what follows, we have grouped our responses to their insightful comments under eleven 
headings.  
R1. How can linguistic representation be investigated?  
We begin by clarifying the nature of our proposal. Although commentators agree about the 
importance of experimental methods for investigating linguistic representation, some of them 
seem to assume that we advocate entirely renouncing the use of acceptability judgments.  But 
as we make clear throughout the article, our argument is that researchers who are interested in 
linguistic representation should not be restricted to using only acceptability judgments.  
Specifically, we contend that ‘the representations underlying language use need not be, and in 
fact should not be, investigated only via [acceptability] judgments’ (Section 1.0). We further 
argue that ‘[our] goal is to consider alternative (experimental) methods to acceptability 
judgments that potentially address the linguistic representations that are implicated in 
language processing’ (Section 1.1), that ‘acceptability judgments are not enough’, and that 
‘researchers concerned with linguistic representations should not rely solely on such 
judgments, and should call on additional methodologies’ (Section 1.2). Moreover we argue 
that ‘acceptability judgments can be used (with appropriate controls) alongside structural 
priming (and perhaps other experimental methods; see Section 1.3) as a means of developing 
representational hypotheses’ (Section 1.4). (Emphasis added throughout.)  
We therefore do not propose abandoning acceptability judgments as a linguistic method 
(Adger; de Ruiter and de Ruiter; Hall, Mayberry, and Ferreira). Nor do we argue that 
structural priming is the only tool that can be used to study linguistic representation 
(Gonzalez-Marquez, Feist and Ströbel; Hartsuiker and Bernolet; Ziegler, Snedeker, and 
Wittenberg). (We suspect that some commentators may have misinterpreted the phrase ‘end 
the current reliance on acceptability judgments’ in the abstract as an exhortation to ‘end the 
current use of acceptability judgments’.)  
But we do argue that priming has a privileged status – it is an implicit method that provides 
access to linguistic structure (i.e., strong generative capacity) and it is unaffected by an 
intervening theory “P”. Acceptability judgments (whether obtained informally or formally) 
provide extensive and valuable, but suggestive, data (in the “context of discovery”; 
Hagoort). In this respect, they stand alongside the use of large-scale corpora to identify the 
types of utterances that occur and the contexts in which they occur (as Lester, Du Bois, 
Gries and Moscoso del Prado Martin note).  Both of these methods provide evidence about 
the classes of acceptable sentences but need further assumptions to help determine linguistic 
structure – and here is where they encounter the problem of constituency tests.  Other 
behavioral and neuroscientific methods (i.e., apart from priming) may provide evidence about 
linguistic structure without the need for constituency tests, but it is much harder to rule out 
explanations relating to the processing theory “P”.   
Adger argues that linguists use experimental tests of a theory “as an injunction to think about 
what the implications of the result mean”. We agree that they should do this, but we do not 
believe that they typically do so (or else papers in theoretical linguistics would make far more 
reference to experimental findings than they do).  In sum, we wholeheartedly agree with 
Hagoort that there is no excuse for failing to use the available experimental and quantitative 
methods. 
R2. How useful is priming?  
A number of commentators express concerns about the versatility of structure priming in 
practice, and the extent to which structural priming studies are able to provide support for 
specific representational proposals (de Ruiter and de Ruiter; Feldman and Milin; Francis; 
Hall et al.; Hartsuiker and Bernolet; MacDonald and Weiss; Mahowald, Futrell and 
Gibson; Maldonado, Spector, and Chemla; Martin, Huettig and Nieuwland; Meyer; 
Ziegler et al.; Rees and Bott). 
As Mahowald et al. note,  the meta-analysis carried out by Mahowald et al. (2016) shows 
that structural priming is robust and highly replicable. Hence criticisms of other priming 
paradigms (e.g., in social psychology) (MacDonald and Weiss) are not relevant. The meta-
analysis also highlights limitations in studies that compare the magnitude of priming under 
different circumstances.  We stress that a large number of converging findings may be 
necessary to be able to be confident about theoretical claims.   
With respect to our specific account, our claims concerning the monostratal nature of 
syntactic representation are based on many individual studies that together argue against 
some level of ‘underlying’ structure.  Our intention in proposing the account in Section 2 is to 
encourage researchers to address both specific and general representational questions, in 
order to broaden the evidence base for theory development. Some of our specific claims may 
of course prove incorrect or incomplete in the light of further research.  
Hence we acknowledge that there is need for reliable, replicable results, and that we need to 
be cautious about underpowered studies, interpreting null results, and so on (e.g., de Ruiter 
and de Ruiter; Mahowald et al.; Maldonado et al.; Meyer; Rees and Bott; Ziegler et al.). 
These concerns apply to any scientific method. Clearly, priming studies require careful 
design, and some studies may be difficult to carry out in practice. But structural priming is 
not inherently more limited than other experimental (or non-experimental) approaches.  
Other commentators are concerned that the value of priming is limited to cases involving 
pairs of roughly equivalent structures (e.g., de Ruiter and de Ruiter; Meyer). As we note, 
most current evidence comes from choices in language production, when a speaker can use 
one structure (e.g., passive) or another (e.g., active) to describe the same situation.  In such 
cases, it is clearly necessary for alternatives to exist (and to be sufficiently frequent that in 
practice participants can be induced to produce both alternatives).  But there are other 
methods of inducing priming, such as priming of alternatives that differ in meaning 
(Scheepers 2003), priming choices in comprehension (e.g., Branigan, Pickering, and McLean 
2005), priming of eye movements during comprehension (e.g., Arai, van Gompel, and 
Scheepers 2007), priming response times in production ((Smith and Wheeldon 2001; Segaert, 
Wheeldon, and Hagoort 2016), priming response times in comprehension (Knoeferle 2014), 
or repetition suppression of the BOLD signal in fMRI adaptation (Segaert et al. 2012).  These 
methods do not always require semantically similar alternatives, and they should allow us to 
use priming more extensively in the future.  
A particular set of priming effects might appear compatible with more than one linguistic 
account (e.g., Francis; Hartsuiker and Bernolet). In some cases, there are ways to rule out 
one alternative (see R10 for some specific examples).  In other cases, the data may fail to 
distinguish between accounts – and this is why priming should be established as a general 
method in which conclusions are drawn from large numbers of studies considered together. 
Some commentators raise concerns about the fact that priming effects reduce with increasing 
exposure (Lester et al.; Ryskin and Brown-Schmidt). Experimenters can take this into 
account (especially when small effect sizes are anticipated) through careful decisions about 
the size and composition of the stimulus set, testing adequate number of participants and 
items, or appropriate statistical analyses. Ziegler et al. observe that magnitudes of priming 
may vary across tasks. This simply means that just as for other experimental tasks (e.g., 
sentence recall versus picture description tasks), researchers should be careful about 
comparing results across tasks.  
Finally, we do not share Meyer’s pessimism concerning the relevance of priming for 
studying children and patients. For instance, priming studies have successfully addressed 
longstanding questions about the extent to which typically developing children and children 
with a Specific Language Impairment have abstract syntactic representations (Bencini and 
Valian 2008; Foltz et al. 2015; Garraffa, Coco, and Branigan 2015; Messenger, Branigan, and 
McLean 2011; Rowland et al. 2012). 
R3. The directness of the relationship between grammar and processing  
MacDonald and Weiss, Martin et al., and Meyer raise questions about the directness of the 
relationship between grammar and processing. Comprehension-to-production priming cannot 
simply be procedural as comprehension and production are different processes.  Therefore we 
suggest it provides access to representation (as argued in Branigan, Pickering, and Cleland 
2000).  It could of course reflect a shared sub-process, for example accessing a linguistic 
constraint.  But if this sub-process is the same across production and comprehension, it is 
hard to see what it could reflect except for the representation itself.  In fact, any form of 
structural priming (including production-to-production) is informative about linguistic 
representation, and researchers do not need to conduct comprehension-to-production priming 
studies to constrain linguistic theory.  Note that a linguistic theory could treat the frequency 
of a syntactic constraint (e.g., V  V NP PP) as part of its linguistic representation (see 
MacDonald and Weiss) but our concern is with the representation of the constraints 
themselves rather than their frequency. 
We do not claim that the apparent automaticity of priming is necessary for making claims 
about representation rather than processes.  Instead, it suggests that priming is not affected by 
strategies or metalinguistic processes – concerns that may affect acceptability judgments.  In 
other words, apparent automaticity gives us more confidence about linguistic representations. 
R4. Does priming access all representations? 
Some commentators suggest that priming may be insensitive to some linguistic 
representations (Koring and Reuland; Maldonado et al.; Rees and Bott).  In other words, 
there may be levels of linguistic representation that are unaffected by priming.  Some 
representations may be inaccessible to any method, whether because they have been 
compiled into different representations online (Berwick and Weinberg 1984) or because they 
have undergone attrition (see Koostra and Rossi).  But the commentators are more 
concerned with the possibility that representations can be accessed but cannot be affected by 
prior exposure – a possibility that would somewhat reduce the effectiveness of priming. We 
propose that the use of a representation (whether in production or comprehension) will affect 
subsequent use of that representation; this is the logic that all accounts of priming depend on. 
But this is an assumption; if it is too strong, then priming would be somewhat less sensitive 
than we assume. Such a limitation would not of course affect the conclusions that we can 
draw from (positive) demonstrations of priming. 
Of course, failure to find priming does not demonstrate that it does not occur – a study may 
have been insensitive or underpowered.  For example, priming without lexical repetition in 
comprehension has sometimes occurred (e.g., Pickering, McLean, and Branigan 2013; 
Thothathiri and Snedeker 2008) and sometimes has not (e.g., Branigan, Pickering, and 
McLean 2005; Traxler, Tooley, and Pickering 2014).  Similarly, evidence for intonational 
priming is limited (de Ruiter and de Ruiter), but to demonstrate that intonational structure 
is represented (in roughly the form assumed by many linguists) and that it cannot be primed 
would involve extensive experimentation.  It is too early to conclude that there is a level of 
linguistic representation that cannot be primed.    
R5. What can acceptability judgments tell us? 
Adger, Ambridge, Gaston, Huang and Phillips, Hall et al., and Sprouse and Almeida 
contend that we unfairly criticise a method that has been used fruitfully (and frugally) for 
decades – although other commentators (e.g., Gonzalez-Marquez et al.; Lester et al.) argue 
that we in fact over-emphasize its significance.  We acknowledge that acceptability 
judgments have been a fertile method for generating hypotheses historically, and we do not 
advocate abandoning them. Indeed, their use is appropriate for field linguistics (Hall et al.) 
when identifying the possible sentences of a language and developing representational 
hypotheses (i.e., in the ‘context of discovery’), but even in these situations researchers should 
carry out priming experiments when possible.  
Our main concern with acceptability judgments does not lie with their informality (Sprouse 
and Almeida), though we do advocate avoiding informality where possible. We agree that 
careful experimentation can determine which judgments can be explained by processing 
limitations (e.g., Sprouse, Wagers, and Phillips 2012). Presumably those judgments that 
cannot be explained by processing limitations are the judgments that are of interest to 
linguists, in the sense that they determine the set of sentences the grammar must be able to 
account for (i.e., its weak generative capacity). Sprouse and Almeida say that establishing 
these data is not in doubt and the concern is with what they call interpreting them.  In other 
words, they argue that determining the set of sentences generated by the grammar is 
straightforward (i.e., the weak generative capacity) and that the difficult issue is identifying 
the structural representations that underlie those sentences (i.e., the strong generative 
capacity).  
There may not be major concerns in practice about identifying the set of sentences that 
should be generated by the linguistic theory (though there remain concerns about consistency 
across types of speaker and task; Dabrowska 2010; Sprouse 2009).  But acceptability 
judgments do not allow us to determine the underlying structural representations, as they 
cannot distinguish among competing analyses of the same data. In contrast, priming allows us 
to distinguish among such analyses – in Sprouse and Almeida’s terms, to interpret the data.  
People may use representations that intrinsically include lexical content, or they may not. 
They may use representations that include elements that are not phonologically realised or 
they may not. The different representations proposed for DO sentences (e.g., a ternary-
branching structure involving no “moved” elements versus a binary-branching structure 
involving “moved” elements; Pollard and Sag 1994 versus Larson 1988) are different 
interpretations of the same data. But they cannot both correspond to a speaker’s mental 
representation for these sentences.   
Some commentators defend constituency tests.  For instance, Gaston et al. propose that the 
apparent contradictions that they yield can be resolved by further enquiry.  This is not correct 
– their contradictions are basic and widespread.  For example, almost anything can be 
coordinated, so it would appear that almost anything can be a constituent.  But this claim is 
possible only if we assume massively flexible constituency (Pickering and Barry 1993; 
Steedman, 2000) – a proposal contested by just about every other linguistic theory.  And in 
practice linguistic theories disagree about the most fundamental points regarding structure 
(not merely the structure of ellipsis or Wh-questions).  Our point is that traditional linguistic 
approaches assume that strong generative capacity can be determined by combining the sets 
of sentences compatible with acceptability judgments (i.e., weak generative capacity) with 
constituency tests.  But if the tests are as flawed as they appear to be, this is impossible, even 
if Sprouse and Almeida are correct about the consistency of acceptability judgments. 
In response to Gaston et al.’s query about the nature of structural priming, the example of 
lexical priming that we use to introduce priming as a phenomenon (Section 1.4) involves 
words that are related but not identical (i.e., associative/semantic priming).  It may be more 
appropriate to compare structural priming with repetition priming of words (e.g., 
Scarborough, Cortese, and Scarborough 1977), which is long lasting, like structural priming  
(Bock and Griffin 2000).  Structural priming appears to be relatively unaffected by contextual 
changes, for example between writing and speech (Cleland and Pickering 2006), but a more 
detailed exploration of such issues is necessary to fully understanding priming itself.  
Understanding a method is of course very important for drawing conclusions using that 
method, but priming (as a cognitive phenomenon) is far better understood than the complex 
combination of language processing, metalinguistic reflection, and decision-making that 
underlies acceptability judgments. Similarly, there is no well-grounded theoretical motivation 
for constituency tests (see Section 1.2). 
  
R6. The stability of linguistic representations 
Several commentators are concerned with the stability of the linguistic representations that 
are investigated in structural priming experiments (Cai & Liu; Francis; Günther;  Hall et 
al.; Kootstra and Rossi; Martin et al.; MacDonald and Weiss; Meyer; Ryskin and 
Brown-Schmidt; Ziegler et al.).  Some commentators suggest that their apparent instability, 
and the fact that priming itself can bring about representational changes, call into question the 
use of structural priming to investigate representation.  
We agree that exposure to particular linguistic structures can affect speakers’ linguistic 
representations, and any linguistic theory must be able to account for such effects.  In 
practice, some researchers have argued that priming may offer an intervention to enhance 
foreign-language learning (McDonough and Mackey 2006) or recovery from aphasia (Cho-
Reyes and Thompson 2012).  More directly, Ivanova, Pickering, McLean, et al. (2012) found 
that participants occasionally produced a DO structure with a verb such as donate after 
encountering another DO sentence with donate, even though such sentences are usually 
regarded as unacceptable (Ambridge).  In other words, priming can change the speaker’s 
representation (at least temporarily).  Other priming effects involve repeated exposure (e.g., 
developing the needs + ed construction; Kaschak and Glenberg 2004).  Importantly, similar 
effects occur in studies in which participants repeatedly make acceptability judgments, 
thereby showing that such judgments are also affected by exposure (Luka and Barsalou 2005; 
Snyder 2000; though cf. Sprouse 2009).   
So the method of investigation (priming) sometimes changes the phenomenon that it is 
investigating.  But this observation is not problematic for our proposals.  Our concern is with 
the nature of the representations that underlie language use at any given time – and such 
representations need not be static. Priming allows us to take a ‘snapshot’ of linguistic 
representations.  Moreover, we can track how those representations change across time and 
what causes them to change (e.g., Cai and Liu; Kootstra and Rossi; Rowland and 
Monaghan). For example, structural priming supports a developmental trajectory during L2 
learning from item-specific representations in less proficient L2 speakers to abstract 
representations in more proficient L2 speakers (Bernolet, Hartsuiker, and Pickering 2013). 
Other studies have shown how children’s syntactic representations at different ages do or do 
not differ from those of adults in specific ways, for example with respect to their 
independence from lexical or semantic content (Messenger et al. 2012; Rowland et al. 2012).  
Of course, we do not claim that they are the same in all respects (Rowland and Monaghan).  
R7. Priming, individuals, and groups 
Priming experiments are typically conducted over fairly large groups of participants, and 
some commentators (Hall et al.; MacDonald and Weiss) therefore assume that anything 
priming tells us must be at the group level – that is, holding over groups of participants with 
the same linguistic representations as each other.  We do not make this assumption. We 
typically assume a common core of structural representations – that people who speak a 
particular language have similar linguistic representations. Of course, the acceptability 
judgment method also tends to make this assumption. But speakers of a language may have 
some different representations. Again, structural priming allows us to investigate variations 
across individual speakers (idiolectal variations) or populations (e.g., L1 versus L2 speakers 
of a language).  
As with any other language, priming should be used to understand the representation of sign 
languages (Hall et al.), and Hall, Ferreira, and Mayberry's (2015) paper paves the way for 
such research.  L1 and L2 ASL signers may have differences in syntactic processing, but the 
priming data suggest that – as with L1 and (proficient) L2 speakers of spoken languages 
(Schoonbaert, Hartsuiker, and Pickering 2007) – the syntactic representations they use during 
processing may have the same (relevant) characteristics. In these studies, syntactic priming 
does not tell us how these representations were constructed during processing (though see 
Slevc and Ivanova for relevant discussion), their interfaces with other representations, how 
those representations are instantiated in the brain, or how they developed.  
Contra MacDonald and Weiss’s contention, it is possible to study priming in individual 
participants. Such studies might require extensive data from an individual, just as in any 
single-case study. Moreover, if a structure can be variably represented within an individual, 
we can use priming to determine which representation is used more often (Günther).   
Finally, Francis’s observation that structural representations are not necessarily 
diachronically stable highlights how priming can address diachronic changes in structural 
representation (Pickering and Garrod, in press). Her example shows how priming could 
distinguish between competing theoretical proposals that acceptability judgments have not 
been able to discriminate, in the same way as priming has been used to examine historically-
motivated accounts of lexical representation (Marslen-Wilson et al. 1994). In principle, 
corpus-based studies of structural priming (Gries 2005; Szmrecsanyi 2006) could also be 
used to track diachronic changes in structural representations. 
R8. Structural priming and language processing (in monologue and dialogue) 
A number of commentators discuss what priming may or may not tell us about language 
processing.  Our focus in this paper is strictly on representation, and so we only consider 
processing to the extent that it is informative about representation (and hence we do not 
address questions such as the timecourse of priming [Martin et al.], or how priming may 
change people’s parsing preferences [Ryskin and Brown-Schmidt]). 
For example, Slevc and Ivanova point out that priming can reflect people’s final parses but 
also their intermediate parses (e.g., Van Gompel et al., 2006).  We therefore need to be 
careful about whether any priming effect depends on a temporary but abandoned 
representation rather than on the final representation.  Investigations of abandoned analyses 
are of course also informative about the process of language comprehension (which analyses 
people consider, whether they hold on to abandoned analyses, and so on).  But such issues are 
not directly relevant to linguistic representation.  
Slevc and Ivanova also discuss how priming might interact with other aspects of cognition, 
such as depth of processing and working memory resources (see also Hartsuiker and 
Bernolet; Martin et al.).  These issues may be important to an understanding of processing, 
for example with respect to the relationship between individual differences in priming and 
other aspects of cognition.  Differences in method (and associated processing demands) can 
also affect priming magnitudes (e.g., Mahowald et al. 2016; Ziegler et al.), so care must be 
taken when comparing studies.  But if such factors are controlled within an experiment, they 
do not undermine the informativeness of priming for understanding linguistic representation, 
as Slevc and Ivanova acknowledge.   
We agree with Kootstra and Rossi that naturalistic studies of priming are beneficial, but for 
current purposes (i.e., linguistic representation) it does not matter whether any effects occur 
under laboratory conditions or not.  We are fascinated by the priming of code-switching, but 
this programme of research is primarily relevant to processing (i.e., language selection) – 
assuming, of course that the code-switcher selects between two independent representations 
of different languages.  In sum, priming is versatile and its implications go well beyond 
linguistic representation (see Pickering & Ferreira, 2008).  
MacDonald and Weiss argue that priming may reflect a general (non-linguistic) tendency to 
repeat prior actions, as demonstrated by parallel priming effects in motor actions and syntax 
(Allen et al. 2010) and between domains such as music and language (van der Cavey and 
Hartsuiker 2016) (see also Kempson and Gregoromichelaki).  But if priming occurs 
between language and non-language, it does not prevent researchers using priming to 
discriminate linguistic theories; it is just that some representations are shared with other 
domains.  To take a more formal example, Steedman (2002) presented an account of action 
based on principles (functional composition and type raising) that are also used in 
Combinatorial Categorial Grammar (Steedman 2000).  Extending these principles to action in 
general does not invalidate his account of linguistic representation – it just means that the 
same principles are used in quite different domains.   
R9. Alternative approaches to linguistic representation  
Alongside structural priming, some commentators suggest further methods for studying 
linguistic representation. Ziegler et al. argue that priming is not special.  If any method 
appears to relate to linguistic representation (e.g., multi-voxel pattern analysis relating to 
thematic roles), then they assume that it can be used to constrain linguistic theory. This is 
reasonable in principle, but is in practice likely to always face the problem that any effect 
could be due to the “parsing procedure P”. For example, it might appear that the N400 in 
ERP research could be diagnostic of semantic anomaly and hence semantic representation, 
whereas the P600 could be diagnostic of syntactic anomaly and hence syntactic 
representation. Whether an anomalous utterance in an ERP experiment produced a N400 or a 
P600 would then be informative about linguistic representation (e.g., Osterhout and Mobley, 
1995, on anaphora).  But it turned out that some semantically anomalous utterances produced 
a P600 (e.g., Kim and Osterhout 2005).  This means that these ERP components are not 
directly informative about linguistic representation.   Rather than focus on one method, 
researchers might be able to combine findings from diverse methods and draw general 
conclusions about linguistic representation.  But there is little sign of this happening, 
presumably because theoretical linguistics would ascribe any such findings to “P”.  Priming 
does not face this concern, in part because there is no need for an indirect intervening theory, 
but also because it has an established methodology that is largely consistently applied across 
studies (a property that it shares with acceptability judgments, of course).   
We agree with Rowland and Monaghan that multiple methods, including corpus research 
and novel word studies, are desirable in developmental research. But such methods have 
important limitations for studying representation. It is unclear whether novel word studies, for 
example, are informative about underlying representations or about processing. We cannot 
tell whether children’s reluctance to produce DO structures with novel verbs that they have 
previously encountered in PO structures is because they do not have an abstract (generalized) 
DO representation, or because they find it difficult to produce unusual word orders. In 
contrast, priming between DO sentences involving different verbs supports an abstract DO 
representation underlying these sentences (Rowland et al. 2012). As we note in R6, priming 
studies can address how representations change (e.g., whether a structure is lexically specific 
at time 1 but not at time 2).  
With respect to non-experimental methods, Gonzales-Marquez et al., Lester et al., and 
Rowland and Monaghan emphasize the potential offered by corpus and distributional 
analyses for both developmental and adult research (see also Rees and Bott). These 
approaches offer valuable data about weak generative capacity and factors that may influence 
structural choices in language use (e.g., Bresnan et al. 2007) (see also R10 below). Recent 
advances in statistical analysis help researchers to exclude confounding variables. However, 
straightforward distributional analyses are less informative than the substantial corpus-based 
evidence of structural priming (see Gries and Kootstra 2017) – an approach that that may also 
address some of the concerns about statistical power highlighted in R2 above. Moreover, 
experimental and corpus-based evidence for priming complement each other.  (Note that 
Kempson and Gregoromichelaki and De Ruiter and De Ruiter query whether syntactic 
priming occurs in conversation on the basis of Healey, Purver, and Howes's, 2014, negative 
results.  But their conclusions contrast with many other demonstrations of priming in 
conversation; e.g., Gries 2005; Gries 2011; Reitter and Moore 2014; Szmrecsanyi 2006).  
Hagoort, Martin et al., and Ziegler et al. propose that neuroimaging techniques can address 
many representational questions. As Hagoort notes, fMRI adaptation (based on variations in 
the BOLD response dependent on previous experience) is a form of priming, and supports the 
segregation of semantic, syntactic, and lexical processing in ways that are shared across 
comprehension and production (Menenti et al. 2011; Segaert et al. 2012). But neuroimaging 
research not based on priming has so far been less informative about representation.  
Cai and Liu suggest that although priming offers deeper insights than intuition-based data 
into the microscopic aspect of linguistic representation, it is less well suited to evaluating the 
macroscopic characteristics of language systems, and specifically the interconnectivity of 
elements at each level. Complex network approaches may offer an interesting way to study 
system-level representational similarities (e.g., between native and non-native speakers) and 
changes in these systems (e.g., during L2 learning), in a way that can complement the 
insights from structural priming into the development of linguistic representations in 
particular populations (such as L2 learners), or in principle in individual speakers.   
  
R10. Details of our theory 
Our linguistic account assumes an architecture that distinguishes distinct semantic, syntactic 
and phonological representations. We agree with Hagoort that it is largely compatible with 
the Memory Unification and Control model (Hagoort 2014; Hagoort and Indefrey 2014), a 
neurobiological model of language based on data from imaging studies that identifies discrete 
neuronal network contributions for unifying semantic, syntactic, and phonological 
information. However, various commentators dispute specific aspects of our account. 
We acknowledge Ziegler et al.’s point that there is less structural priming evidence relating 
to semantic structure than to syntactic structure, a point that reflects the greater interest 
historically in the latter than the former (e.g., Bock 1986). But it is not contentious that 
structural priming of semantic structure occurs and that it is informative for theories of 
semantic representation (Maldonado et al.; see also Bunger, Papafragou, and Trueswell 
2013, for priming of event structure, and  Rees and Bott for extension to pragmatic 
representation). Furthermore, studies converge in supporting a lexically independent level of 
semantic representation that includes quantificational information. We anticipate that the 
growing interest in the use of structural priming to investigate semantic representation will 
give rise to more detailed theoretical proposals based on converging evidence from multiple 
studies, as has occurred for syntactic representation. 
Ambridge, Gonzalez-Marquez et al., Günther, Lester et al., and Ziegler et al. express 
some scepticism about a level of syntactic representation that is independent of semantic and 
lexical information. The finding that priming of syntactic structure is not enhanced when 
thematic mappings or semantic features are repeated  (Bock and Loebell 1990; Huang et al. 
2016; Messenger et al. 2012) suggests that semantic information is not incorporated into 
syntactic structure. It specifically fits badly with the construction-based approach advocated 
by Günther, who suggests that priming effects might hold between entire constructions 
(which could be related but of different types), or just their syntactic (i.e., form) or their 
semantic (i.e., meaning) components. The straightforward interpretation of a construction 
grammar is that it involves form-meaning pairings and that these pairings can be primed.  
This is compatible with integrated syntax and semantics.  Günther suggests that priming can 
occur between the form or the meaning side of a form-meaning pairing.  But if so, this means 
there is autonomy of syntax.  Such autonomy can explain priming between sentences with the 
same syntax but very different meanings (e.g., from locatives to passives; Bock and Loebell 
1990). 
In our account, thematic relations and other semantic information are represented separately 
from syntactic structure, and are mapped to syntactic representations (e.g., Chang, Bock, and 
Goldberg 2003; Köhne, Pickering, and Branigan 2014; Cai, Pickering, and Branigan 2012). 
Not surprisingly, some mappings are preferred over others (e.g., Bresnan et al., 2007; Ferreira 
1994; Kempen and Harbusch 2004). But such preferences do not imply that semantic (or 
indeed lexical) content is part of the syntactic representation. Moreover, acceptability 
judgments for sentences reflect their likelihood of occurrence (Bresnan 2007), so it is 
unsurprising that sentences involving preferred mappings are rated as more acceptable than 
sentences involving less preferred mappings (Ambridge). In fact, Ambridge’s results suggest 
that acceptability judgments are affected by semantic factors, a point that reinforces our 
conclusion that acceptability judgments do not straightforwardly reflect syntactic 
representation. 
With respect to the relationship between lexical content and syntactic structure, Ziegler et al. 
argue that function words can be a locus of priming, based on Ferreira's (2003) study. In fact, 
Ferreira argued for an autonomous, lexically independent syntactic component, consistent 
with our account: Participants did not produce structures that included complementizer that 
following primes that included complementizer that unless the primes also involved the same 
syntactic structure. In other words, repetition of the function word alone did not determine 
choice of structure (see also Bock 1989).  
Similarly, our claim that syntactic representations are independent of closed class features is 
not undermined by Feldman and Milin’s finding of differences in priming of single word 
production (measured by response latencies) depending on the modality of the prime 
(drawing vs. word), and differences in the specific verb form that was produced. Any such 
effects do not appear to relate to structural priming (as far as is known; Pickering and 
Branigan 1998).   
Regarding open-class lexical content, priming evidence provides no support for redundant 
representations in which the same utterance (or part of an utterance) is represented both as a 
single lexicalized chunk and as the integration of several more schematic constructions 
(Günther). If this were the case, we might expect stronger priming from frequently 
encountered phrases (which should be more likely to be redundantly represented), as there 
would be two potential sources of priming (Rowland et al. 2012). However Konopka and 
Bock (2009) found that idiomatic expressions and non-idiomatic expressions yielded the 
same priming.  
Hartsuiker and Bernolet suggest that the lexical boost to priming (which appears to be 
short-lived) need not reflect a link between syntactic representations and the lexicon, but may 
instead arise from an explicit memory of the prime that rapidly decays, with the verb acting 
as a retrieval cue. Malhotra et al. (2008) demonstrated (using a dynamical systems model) 
that our assumption of a link between syntactic representations and the lexicon is compatible 
with a short-lived lexical boost. The longevity of the lexical boost does not therefore 
discriminate between our account and alternative accounts. Furthermore, it does not matter 
whether explicit memory processes are involved in priming: Any such memories must still 
make reference to abstract structure (e.g., that the verb give appeared with an NP and an NP) 
to be able to explain priming between non-identical sentences (Branigan and McLean 2016). 
Note also that these memories cannot be based on specific wordforms (because the lexical 
boost is unaffected by repetition of specific features such as tense, aspect and number; 
Pickering and Branigan 1998).   
Other commentators discuss alternative ways of conceptualizing an abstract level of syntactic 
representation. Hudson supports our overall approach but suggests that priming evidence 
suggests that we should abandon the standard assumption that constituent-structure is basic, 
and with dependencies (e.g., subject-verb agreement) being defined with respect to 
constituent-structure.  Instead, he treats dependency as basic and constituency as derivative at 
best.  It seems most straightforward to us to define priming (e.g., of Prepositional Object vs. 
Double Object) in constituent-structure terms (e.g., priming VP  V NP PP rather than V  
V NP NP), but it would presumably also be possible to define it in terms of dependencies, for 
instance from V to N (i.e., the head noun of the NP) and V to P (i.e., the head preposition of 
the PP) rather than dependencies from V to N and V to N.  Of course, priming of subject-verb 
agreement itself (Haskell, Thornton, and MacDonald 2010) fits particularly well with a 
dependency-based analysis.  An analysis of priming in terms of a dependency-based grammar 
such as Word Grammar (Hudson 2010) would be very interesting. 
Kempson and Gregoromichelaki propose that our data do not need to be interpreted in 
terms of hierarchical representations such as those derived from context-free constraints (or 
similar), and interpret it in terms of sequential patterns of processing actions (see also 
O’Grady).  If those patterns discriminate between linguistic structures that prime differently 
(e.g., the sequential pattern for POs differs from the pattern for DOs), then their approach 
may be able to capture priming data, and an analysis in terms of dynamic syntax would also 
be very interesting (Cann, Kempson, and Marten 2005).   
Adger and Koring and Reuland (see also Gaston et al.) challenge our use of priming 
between unergatives and unaccusatives to propose that they have similar syntactic 
representations.  In contrast, their favored accounts assume that unaccusatives have a very 
different structure from unergatives – a difference that would almost certainly preclude 
priming, given the sensitivity of priming to comparable syntactic differences (e.g., priming 
does not occur between constructions with different numbers of arguments).  Koring and 
Reuland simply assume an analysis involving “NP-movement” but we query the 
assumptions that underlie analyses such as theirs.  We do not dispute syntactic distinctions 
between types of subjects (though at least some relevant distinctions between unergatives 
versus unaccusatives may be semantic rather than syntactic; e.g., Zaenen 1988), but argue 
that these distinctions do not require different constituent-structure representations.  
Similarly, Adger assumes that a distinction between Lily froze solid and *Lily danced tired 
means that Lily froze and Lily danced must have different constituent structures.  Instead, it 
shows that danced and froze have syntactic properties that allow them both to combine with 
just a subject but which have different effects on combination with a subject and another 
constituent.  We cannot conclude that Lily froze and Lily danced have different constituent 
structures. Approaches such as Koring and Reuland’s and  Adger’s would lead to extremely 
complex constituent-structures and is challenged by theories assuming “flat” structures (e.g., 
Culicover and Jackendoff 2005; Pollard and Sag 1994).   
Our concern with many other experimental methods is that their results can be due to 
processing (i.e., processing theory ‘P’ in Chomsky 1981).  We therefore did not review all 
results (indeed we did not have the space to do so).  As an example, Bever and Sanz 's (1997) 
finding of faster responses to a probe word associated with a subject noun that preceded an 
unaccusative compared to an unergative verb could be due to semantic differences between 
unaccusatives and unergatives (rather than reactivating an antecedent at an NP-trace) (see 
also Agnew et al. 2014).  Both Koring and Reuland and Adger point to many experimental 
studies that contrast unaccusative and unergative sentences, but none of them demonstrate 
that the distinctions are due to constituent structure differences.  Many experimental methods 
such as studies using reactivation or visual world paradigms provide results relating to 
interpretation – there may be an underlying syntactic cause of the effects or there may not, 
but we typically cannot tell.  In contrast, priming is informative about syntactic 
representation. 
We also note that our description of “mainstream GG” (Koring and Reuland) is our best 
attempt to capture the key issues of a family of views and to ignore factional distinctions. It is 
not helpful to argue that we are using concepts that are obsolete within the authors’ favored 
branch of linguistic theory – we are simply trying to describe a complex state of affairs and 
identify the core issues that we wish to dispute.   
Kwon and Lee argue that priming evidence provides only limited benefit compared with 
acceptability judgments.  But criticising a new method on the grounds that it has not 
discovered as much as an old method would simply lead to stagnation.  Their specific point 
about distinguishing linear and hierarchical relations is more insightful.  We believe that 
priming data support a single level of structure that is specified for linear and hierarchical 
relations together, rather than one in which hierarchical structure is independently 
represented.  For example, Bernolet, Hartsuiker, and Pickering (2007) found priming between 
German and Dutch noun phrases which both have adjective-verb order (the X that red is) but 
not between English and Dutch, presumably because English has verb-adjective order.  In 
other words, the priming is not localized at an unordered hierarchical level (relative clause, 
unspecified for order) and therefore we propose that such an unordered level does not exist.  
In response to Hartsuiker and Bernolet, the absence of priming for PO structures following 
‘shifted’ PO prime sentences is compatible with an account in which there is no priming of 
independent hierarchical relations, and thematic-function and thematic-order priming effects 
counteract each other (Cai, Pickering, and Branigan 2012).   
We of course do not assume that syntax can be reduced to simple sequential structure (see 
also Gaston et al.) – otherwise we would not assume constituent-structure representations 
such as those in Fig 1. And priming also cannot be reduced to linear order.  For example, it 
occurs when the internal structure of prime and target constituents are different (e.g., complex 
vs. simple noun phrases in dative priming; see Fox Tree and Meijer 1999; Pickering and 
Branigan 1998), or when the critical alternation occurs at a different location in the prime and 
target, for example datives in main versus subordinate clauses (Branigan et al. 2006) or noun 
phrases sentence-initially versus -finally (Melinger and Cleland 2011). 
Hartsuiker and Bernolet and Francis question how we interpret the representation of 
coerced sentences. Hartsuiker and Bernolet argue that the control (event) sentences could 
be given a coerced reading (i.e., both sentences could have a missing predicate represented).  
But the picture presented with the prime sentence forced it to have an event reading. 
Additionally, although coerced and control sentences did not differentially prime the 
production of full VP targets (relative to VP-primes such as began drinking the champagne), 
they did differentially prime the production of coerced targets, with coerced primes inducing 
more coerced targets than control primes. This finding further suggests that participants did 
not postulate a predicate for control primes.  Francis proposes that Raffray et al.’s (2014) 
data might be due entirely to syntactic priming and so might indicate that the three sentence 
types (began the speech, began the champagne, began drinking the champagne) all have 
different syntactic structures.  The problem with this explanation is that a purely syntactic 
account might argue that began the champagne had a covert V (corresponding to drinking) 
but began the speech could not have a covert V – and if this is the case, began the champagne 
should behave more similarly than began the speech to began drinking the champagne, 
contrary to Raffray et al.’s findings.   
R11. Further directions   
We argue in the target article that structural priming can be used to address outstanding 
linguistic controversies, and highlight some specific examples (Section 3.1). Commentators 
identify interesting further cases that exemplify the potential of this method. 
Francis discusses how priming might be used to clarify the syntactic representation of 
quantificational NPs, and specifically whether they have the same representation as collective 
NPs. Assuming that an appropriate experiment can be designed (e.g., an alternative form for 
a lot of papers), then any finding that A bundle of sticks primes A lot of papers would suggest 
that quantificational NPs and collective NPs involve the same syntactic representation, in 
which the first noun acts as the head.  We suspect that such priming would occur, because 
priming appears to be sensitive to categorical distinctions rather than featural distinctions 
(e.g., tense or number; Pickering and Branigan 1998).  
O’Grady highlights how priming could be used to test specific representational questions 
across typologically diverse languages.  As we note in Section 3.2, such studies can address 
fundamental questions about the diversity of linguistic representations and potential language 
universals. With respect to subject-verb sequences, it may well be possible to prime neither is 
versus are (for example) and demonstrate that such priming constitutes priming of subject-
verb agreement, rather than simply priming of the verb form (see Haskell, Thornton, and 
MacDonald 2010).  Any such priming could be due to semantic rather than syntactic 
relations, as both types of dependency affect choice of verb form (cf. Bock, Nicol, and 
Cutting 1999).  And even if the effects are syntactic, they could relate to a unit consisting of 
the whole sentence rather than one consisting of the subject and verb.  For example, the locus 
of priming for neither are satisfactory could be NP+pl V+pl AP rather than NP+pl V+pl.  We also 
suggest that priming different interpretations of Everyone didn’t finish the project takes place 
at the semantic rather than syntactic level.   
Rees and Bott point to Bott and Chemla's ( 2016) finding that scalar implicatures can be 
primed (see also Maldonado et al.). We see this as a fascinating example of how priming can 
be extended to further linguistic domains, specifically diverse aspects of structure relating to 
interpretation. Priming of pragmatic representations is of course compatible with it being 
sensitive to all levels of linguistic representation.  
Cai and Liu and Kootstra and Rossi suggest ways in which structural priming can be used 
to investigate bilingual representation. In particular, Kootstra and Rossi note that priming 
can be used to study first language attrition.  We agree – it could be used to determine 
whether an L1 had become completely inaccessible or not.  It would of course be possible for 
a language to be temporarily inaccessible but to become accessible again later in life, and it 
might be possible to use priming to render an inaccessible language accessible again.  
Finally, we support Hagoort’s suggestion that fMRI adaptation offers promising directions 
for future research that may allow us to identify more precisely the type of priming that 
occurs, as different linguistic representations lead to adaptation in different brain areas.  This  
approach may be particularly appropriate for studying structures that do not involve 
alternations. It is also likely to be yield important findings about the neural basis of linguistic 
representation.   It shows one way in which our proposals about the use of priming to 
understand linguistic representation may be extended, and therefore underlines their value in 
the development of the cognitive sciences of language. 
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